How NATO could benefit from not always looking unified
(with Greenland and Ukraine as live examples in January 2026)
Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
NATO is usually described as a credibility machine: 32 countries making a single promise—collective defence under Article 5—whose value depends on the belief that the alliance will actually act. In that story, public unity is everything.
My hypothesis flips the frame: what if “looking messy” is sometimes useful—not because NATO is actually divided operationally, but because a noisier public face increases uncertainty for adversaries like Russia and China about what exactly will happen in a crisis?
That idea isn’t crazy in the abstract. Deterrence often benefits from strategic ambiguity—leaving an opponent uncertain about precise red lines, thresholds, escalation ladders, and response packages. NATO itself has long operated with a degree of ambiguity in escalation and deterrence posture.
But there’s a sharp distinction between:
- strategic ambiguity (uncertainty about how the alliance responds, while certainty about that it responds), and
- strategic incoherence (uncertainty about whether the alliance responds at all).
Only the first is stabilizing. The second invites testing, wedge tactics, and miscalculation.
What follows is a structured way to evaluate a “good cop–bad cop NATO” hypothesis—using Ukraine and Greenland as the two theatres where this argument is most plausible on paper and most dangerous in practice.
1) Why “not appearing unified” can be rational in alliance politics
1.1 Deterrence runs on the adversary’s uncertainty—not your own
In basic deterrence logic, you want an opponent to believe that aggression will trigger costs they can’t tolerate. Sometimes that’s best achieved through clarity (“we will respond”). Sometimes it’s strengthened by ambiguity (“we will respond, but you can’t confidently predict how far we’ll go or which form the response will take”).
For alliances, ambiguity can be especially valuable because it:
- complicates adversary planning (harder to optimize a provocation),
- increases the chance an adversary misprices risk upward,
- and reduces “gaming the threshold” (probing right under a clearly stated line).
That is not a fringe concept. NATO scholarship explicitly discusses ambiguity about escalation within a multinational alliance—partly because consensus politics makes perfectly crisp escalation promises hard to sustain.
1.2 Public disunity can create “fog of political will”
Militaries can often estimate capabilities. What’s harder is political will: will parliaments vote funds, will publics tolerate risk, will leaders choose escalation, will governments fracture under pressure?
When allied leaders send mixed messages, an adversary may lose confidence in forecasting “will,” which can deter opportunistic escalation. The key is that this fog must be performative externally while the internal planning remains coherent.
1.3 “Two-level games” make disunity look strategic even when it isn’t
Sometimes “disunity” is not choreography. It’s domestic politics leaking outward.
- Leaders signal toughness to their home voters.
- They also bargain with allies over burden-sharing.
- Their public posture becomes a negotiating tool.
From the outside, this can resemble a coordinated routine even when it’s just parallel domestic incentives producing a noisy collective output.
So the baseline analytic stance should be: apparent disunity can be strategic without being centrally coordinated.
2) The core mechanism: how “good cop–bad cop” can work in international bargaining
“Good cop–bad cop” diplomacy works when:
- Both cops are ultimately aligned on the desired outcome.
- The “bad cop” is credible enough to scare the target.
- The “good cop” is credible enough to offer a safer path.
- The target believes the “good cop” can actually restrain the “bad cop.”
In alliance politics, this can translate into:
- Bad cop (threat): “We might abandon you / reduce support / demand more.”
- Good cop (assurance): “We will keep things stable—but you must step up.”
The upside: it forces allies or partners to internalize risk and contribute more.
The downside: if anyone stops believing alignment exists, the routine becomes a real rupture.
3) Ukraine: how rhetorical “uncertainty” can pressure Europe—and how it can also feed Russian risk-taking
3.1 The factual baseline: Europe has carried a large share of assistance
NATO’s own accounting notes that Allies provided over EUR 50 billion in security assistance in 2024, with almost 60% coming from European Allies and Canada, and that in 2025 Allies had committed an additional EUR 35 billion so far.
The EU has also formalized long-term security commitments with Ukraine (e.g., the EU–Ukraine joint security commitments signed in June 2024).
So my point that Europe is geographically closer and bears a heavy responsibility is consistent with publicly available tallies and institutional statements.
3.2 Trump’s Ukraine posture in 2025: “threatening signals” plus continued flows
If the claim is “Trump threatened abandonment but did nothing,” the reality looks more mixed and more revealing.
- Reuters reported that Trump paused U.S. military aid after a clash with President Zelenskiy in early March 2025.
- Reuters then reported the U.S. agreed to resume military aid and intelligence sharing after talks in Jeddah, tied to a proposed ceasefire framework.
- A UK Parliament briefing (Oct 2025) says Trump did not seek congressional approval for new funding, but the U.S. largely continued delivering aid committed under Biden, and the U.S. stepped back from leading the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.
- Reuters reported a July 2025 shift: Trump announced a deal to send U.S. weapons to Ukraine through NATO, with allies paying—again, a menu-of-options approach rather than simple abandonment.
- Reuters also reported that Congress passed a 2026 defense bill including $800 million for Ukraine and provisions supporting NATO’s role and limiting reductions of U.S. forces in Europe.
Taken together, this looks like a pattern of credible uncertainty (pauses, conditions, rhetoric) combined with continuing institutional support pathways—especially those that shift financial burden and coordination leadership toward European allies.
3.3 A “strategic disunity” interpretation of this pattern
Under my hypothesis, the play could be:
- The U.S. (or a U.S. president) signals that support is conditional and could shrink.
- Europe reacts by increasing spending, expanding industrial capacity, and assuming leadership roles.
- Russia sees uncertainty and tries to exploit it, but also must account for the possibility of sudden re-hardening (resumed aid, new weapons packages, NATO-mediated pipelines).
There is a real-world analogue here: Trump’s March 2025 pause followed by resumed support and later weapons announcements is exactly the kind of oscillation that makes forecasting difficult for both allies and adversaries.
3.4 The danger: ambiguity that undermines deterrence
This is where my idea hits its sharp edge.
For Ukraine, Russia is constantly probing two questions:
- Will Ukraine be sustained materially?
- Will the West fracture politically?
If public disunity convinces Moscow that the answer to #2 is “yes,” then ambiguity doesn’t deter—it tempts. The more an adversary believes time is on its side (Western fatigue, election cycles, budget fights), the more it may escalate.
So “not appearing unified” is only beneficial if the adversary concludes: “Even if they argue, the system delivers.” The moment the adversary concludes: “They argue because they cannot deliver,” the logic flips.
4) Defence spending: Trump’s NATO threats as coercive theatre and why it plausibly changed behaviour
4.1 The trend is real: NATO spending increased sharply after 2014
NATO’s Secretary General Annual Report 2024 says that in 2024, 22 Allies met the 2% guideline, compared with only three in 2014, and that over the last 10 years the cumulative increase added over USD 700 billion for defence.
So the “allies stepped up” story is empirically anchored, even if causality is shared across many factors (Crimea 2014, full-scale invasion 2022, U.S. pressure, industrial realities).
4.2 Trump and “credit claiming”: NATO leadership explicitly cited increased spending during his term
In July 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said: “since President Trump took office, European Allies and Canada have added an additional 41 billion dollars to their defence spending.”
This doesn’t prove Trump alone caused it, but it does show NATO leadership publicly connected the spending trajectory to the political pressure environment.
4.3 The “bad cop” element: threats to abandon or weaken protection
Trump repeatedly used rhetoric that raised doubts about U.S. willingness to defend allies who didn’t meet spending targets—famously claiming he told an ally he would “encourage” Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to “delinquent” countries. Reuters and PBS covered the statement and reactions.
That’s classic “bad cop” signalling: it increases perceived risk for allies and forces budgetary reprioritization.
4.4 Why this can “work” even if it’s destabilizing
Even if European leaders publicly denounce the rhetoric, they still have to hedge against a future U.S. policy shift. Hedging often means: spend more, build capacity, diversify supply chains, strengthen European pillars.
So you can plausibly argue that public turbulence is part of a coercive bargaining environment that accelerated European defence spending—without claiming there was a centrally choreographed plan.
5) Greenland and the Arctic: when “strategic disunity” becomes intra-alliance crisis
The Greenland example is more radical than Ukraine because it introduces a near-taboo scenario: a U.S. president pressuring (or threatening) a NATO ally over sovereign territory.
5.1 What’s happening now (January 2026)
Reuters reported today (Jan 20, 2026) that Trump said he had a “very good” call with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte regarding Greenland and reiterated that the U.S. should discuss acquiring Greenland, citing Denmark’s inability to protect it.
The Guardian reported Trump refused to rule out force (“no comment”) and threatened tariffs over Greenland, prompting condemnation from European leaders and talk of enhanced NATO surveillance in Greenland supported by Rutte.
Reuters also published an exchange of messages in which Trump argued NATO should support “complete U.S. control” of Greenland, while Nordic leaders sought de-escalation discussions.
This sits in a longer arc: Reuters reported in January 2025 that Trump refused to rule out military or economic action to pursue acquisition of Greenland (and the Panama Canal).
Reuters earlier this month reported Greenland’s prime minister urged calm and said citizens should not fear imminent takeover, while seeking to strengthen ties with the U.S.
5.2 Why Greenland is strategically important in non-theatrical terms
Even without any “Napoleon” framing, Greenland matters for:
- Arctic access and surveillance,
- space and missile warning infrastructure (e.g., the U.S. Pituffik Space Base),
- sea lanes and undersea infrastructure,
- and long-term resource geopolitics.
ABC notes the U.S. has a long-standing military presence in Greenland dating back to WWII and that Pituffik is the only U.S. base there.
5.3 The “good cop–bad cop” story I propose
In my framing:
- Trump plays the aggressive “bad cop” (buy/take Greenland), terrifying European publics and forcing attention.
- EU/Nordic actors play the “good cop,” reassuring voters and sending forces or increasing NATO surveillance, which can be sold domestically as “countering Trump” even if it also strengthens Arctic defence against Russia/China.
- The adversary (Russia/China) can’t easily interpret whether NATO is fracturing or repositioning, creating uncertainty.
This is an intelligible strategic narrative.
5.4 The problem: this is the kind of “disunity” that can poison alliance credibility
There’s a difference between ambiguity about escalation against an adversary and ambiguity about conflict inside the alliance.
If allies start planning for “deterrence against the United States” in Greenland—politically or militarily—that isn’t strategic ambiguity. That’s alliance breakdown.
Even if EU deployments to Greenland are framed as “countering Trump,” adversaries can interpret the spectacle as:
- NATO cohesion weakening,
- U.S.–Europe strategic drift deepening,
- and intra-West bargaining becoming coercive rather than consensual.
That can be good for adversaries even if it complicates short-term prediction.
So Greenland is the clearest case where “not appearing unified” might help create uncertainty but simultaneously erodes the foundation on which NATO deterrence rests.
6) Would Russia and China actually be “confused”—or would they exploit the noise?
Adversaries don’t rely only on headlines. They have intelligence, diplomatic access, economic indicators, and long observation of institutional behaviour.
So the real question isn’t “can they read a Reuters headline.” It’s:
- Can they forecast alliance decision dynamics in a crisis?
- Can they reliably exploit domestic veto points?
- Can they wedge one ally off another?
6.1 How ambiguity can help NATO
It helps when:
- internal planning is solid,
- force posture is credible,
- and the public noise doesn’t translate into real paralysis.
NATO’s post-2014 deterrence posture on the eastern flank has increasingly emphasized forward presence and a commitment to defend “every inch,” evolving from tripwire logic toward stronger forward defence commitments.
That material posture can anchor deterrence even when politics is noisy.
6.2 How ambiguity can hurt NATO
It hurts when:
- noise signals real division over core commitments,
- or when messaging implies conditionality about Article 5.
Trump’s rhetoric about not protecting “delinquent” allies (and encouraging Russia) is precisely the type that can undermine deterrence if taken literally by Moscow.
The paradox is: rhetoric designed to squeeze allies can also invite adversary probing.
7) Three plausible models for what we’re seeing
Model A: Coordinated “good cop–bad cop” (strong version)
This would mean U.S. and EU leaders privately coordinate roles to manipulate adversary expectations and manage domestic audiences.
Evidence threshold: high.
Public evidence: thin.
Most of what we have in public reporting supports “interaction and bargaining,” not deliberate choreography.
Model B: Emergent strategic ambiguity (medium version)
Leaders pursue their domestic and bargaining goals; the aggregate effect creates useful uncertainty for adversaries, even without coordination.
This is often how the real world works: messy systems sometimes produce strategically useful outputs by accident.
Model C: Genuine fragmentation (weakest for NATO, strongest risk)
Disunity isn’t strategy; it’s disagreement. The noise is a symptom of real divergence in interests and threat perceptions, which adversaries can exploit.
Greenland rhetoric today makes this model more plausible than it would have seemed a few years ago, because it is hard to reframe sovereign coercion against an ally as mere theatre.
8) What NATO would need to “benefit from disunity” without collapsing
If NATO wants ambiguity benefits without credibility loss, it needs a disciplined split:
Keep public ambiguity about:
- exact thresholds and timelines,
- specific response packages,
- escalation ladders,
- and operational details.
But maintain public clarity about:
- Article 5 commitment,
- the non-negotiability of allied sovereignty,
- and baseline support for partners like Ukraine (even if modalities shift).
And maintain private unity through:
- real force posture,
- real stockpiles and industrial scaling,
- and pre-negotiated crisis playbooks.
Ukraine is the theatre where this balance is possible: you can argue over modalities (who pays, which systems, which timelines) while the pipeline still runs.
Greenland is the theatre where this balance is hardest: coercive sovereignty talk risks turning ambiguity into outright alliance trauma.
Conclusion: “not appearing unified” can be a tool—but only in narrow, carefully bounded ways
My thesis has a real strategic core:
- Ambiguity can deter by making adversaries less able to price risk.
- Public turbulence can pressure allies to invest more, as the post-2014 spending trajectory and NATO leadership statements suggest.
- In Ukraine, Trump-era oscillation (pause → resume → NATO-mediated weapons pipeline) shows how an alliance can look politically unstable while still delivering material support—at least some of the time.
But the thesis also has a hard limit:
- If “disunity” starts to question allied sovereignty or Article 5 credibility, it stops being a deterrence tool and becomes an invitation to adversary probing.
Right now (January 2026), Greenland is the most dangerous place to test my hypothesis, because the public dispute itself risks becoming the strategic gift to Moscow and Beijing—regardless of whether it confuses them about the next move.
