The phrase Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) sits in an awkward category: it is widely used, politically explosive, and partly “real” in the way many intelligence labels are real—less a registered corporation than an analytic umbrella for overlapping people, routes, favors, and protections. If you’re looking for a single logo, a clear org chart, and a stable membership roster, you will be disappointed. If you’re looking for evidence that some Venezuelan state actors have been credibly accused—sometimes indicted, sometimes sanctioned—of protecting or facilitating drug trafficking, you’ll find a long paper trail.
This essay treats the topic the way a careful political scientist would: separating (1) the name, (2) the network behavior the name points to, (3) what has been alleged in courts and sanctions regimes, and (4) what remains inference, rumor, or politics.
1) The epistemic trap: when a label becomes a “thing”
Most public discussion jumps too quickly from label → organization. But “cartel” can mean at least three different things:
- A vertically organized trafficking enterprise (classic cartel model: leadership, enforcement arm, standardized pipelines).
- A market of brokers (corrupt gatekeepers selling safe passage, documents, ports, airspace, protection).
- A state-embedded protection system (segments of the security apparatus that convert sovereignty into revenue: border control, air-defense decisions, port inspections, passports, customs, intelligence files).
A key reason Cartel de los Soles stays fuzzy is that it is often described—by analysts and even by U.S. officials—as closer to #3 than #1: cells and patronage inside state institutions, not a single “brand” with press releases. InSight Crime’s framing is exactly this: a hybrid state in which criminal networks form within the state, sometimes cooperating with armed non-state actors, sometimes competing, and often renting out protection. fln.dk
That matters for a “plausible deniability” option. If the phenomenon is state-embedded, then ambiguity is not merely a tactic—it is structural. A minister doesn’t need a cartel patch; he needs loyal colonels, selective enforcement, and a cashflow that binds everyone by mutual exposure.
2) Why “no unified name/symbols” can be a feature, not a bug
I am suggesting the group may avoid unified names and symbols so that any caught member can be dismissed as a “bad apple.” That is plausible as a strategy, but it’s also consistent with two deeper mechanisms:
A. Compartmentalization by patronage
State-embedded corruption tends to be compartmentalized because:
- each node (a port commander, an air-defense officer, a customs chief) monetizes its own chokepoint;
- patronage ties substitute for formal hierarchy;
- everyone benefits from not knowing too much beyond their lane.
This produces “cells” that can be semi-independent. Even observers sympathetic to the U.S. case often describe the “cartel” as disconnected military-embedded cells rather than a clean pyramid. Al Jazeera+1
B. The “sovereignty-as-a-service” model
In a pure trafficking organization, the group must build logistics. In a state-embedded network, the group sells permissions: safe corridors, documents, radar blindness, and selective policing. This creates a governance-like revenue system—more like a protection state than a cartel brand.
So the plausible deniability point doesn’t require a conscious PR decision (“let’s not pick a symbol”). It can emerge organically: what you are calling “the cartel” is the pattern of corruption itself.
3) The most concrete public record: indictments, pleas, and sanctions
There’s a wide spectrum of “claims” in this space. The most solid, publicly checkable anchors are:
A. U.S. Justice Department indictments and press statements (2020)
In March 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice announced charges against Nicolás Maduro and multiple current/former Venezuelan officials, alleging they acted as leaders/managers of the Cartel de los Soles, partnered with the FARC, and dispatched cocaine from Venezuela toward the U.S. via Caribbean/Central American transshipment points (with maritime and air routes). The DOJ press release explicitly describes the name as derived from the sun insignia on Venezuelan generals’ uniforms and frames the alleged conspiracy as “narco-terrorism.” Justizministerium
Important caveat: DOJ statements are allegations unless proven in court. The DOJ itself stresses this (indictment ≠ conviction). Justizministerium
B. A guilty plea that strengthens the evidentiary posture (2025)
In June 2025, DOJ announced that former Venezuelan intelligence chief Hugo “El Pollo” Carvajal pled guilty to charges including conspiracy to import cocaine into the U.S. and narco-terrorism for the benefit of the FARC, plus weapons-related offenses. Justizministerium
A guilty plea is not the same as a full public trial record—but it is materially stronger than a purely political accusation, because it is a formal admission in a criminal proceeding.
C. Treasury sanctions designating Cartel de los Soles as SDGT (July 2025)
In July 2025, the U.S. Treasury (OFAC) announced sanctions designating Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, describing it as Venezuela-based and “headed by Nicolás Maduro Moros and other high-ranking individuals,” and alleging it provided material support to groups the U.S. had designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (notably Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel). U.S. Department of the Treasury+1
Sanctions are not court convictions; they are executive/administrative actions. But they’re still a significant data point about what the U.S. government claims it believes it can support in its administrative record.
D. Foreign Terrorist Organization designation notice (Nov 2025)
A notice published via the Federal Register states that the U.S. Secretary of State designated Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization effective publication. Federal Register
This matters for the terrorism-funding question, because the legal category changes the compliance and enforcement environment around any alleged facilitators.
E. Venezuela’s denial and the politics of the narrative
On the other side, Venezuela has repeatedly denied these allegations, at times calling the “cartel” non-existent; coverage around the U.S. designation notes the Venezuelan government’s rejection and emphasizes the geopolitical stakes. Reuters+1
A responsible analysis has to hold both realities at once:
- The U.S. has produced indictments, sanctions, and at least one major guilty plea tied to the core narrative.
- The narrative also functions as a tool in a high-conflict political relationship, where incentives for exaggeration exist.
4) Who is “involved”? What you can list without overclaiming
Because this is politically and legally sensitive, the safest way to talk about “people involved” is to use categories:
1) Individuals explicitly named in DOJ actions
The 2020 DOJ announcement names Maduro, Diosdado Cabello, Hugo Carvajal, Clíver Alcalá Cordones, plus others in separate charging actions, and alleges a long-running conspiracy with the FARC. Justizministerium
2) Individuals sanctioned under counternarcotics / corruption authorities
A Congressional Research Service overview (2019) lists Venezuelan officials designated under the Kingpin Act across multiple years (including Carvajal, Henry Rangel Silva, Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, Clíver Alcalá Cordones, and later Tareck el Aissami, among others). Congress.gov
3) Family-adjacent trafficking cases as a window into access
The “narcosobrinos” case—nephews of Venezuela’s first lady—resulted in U.S. convictions and prison sentences for conspiring to import large quantities of cocaine into the U.S., with prosecutors alleging links to the FARC in the sourcing story. Justizministerium
This category doesn’t “prove the regime is a cartel,” but it shows something narrower and still significant: actors with unusually close access were prosecuted for unusually large-scale trafficking behavior.
4) Older “port economy” corruption cases that illustrate the mechanism
The Walid Makled saga (and related reporting) has long been cited in discussions of Venezuelan port/official protection and payments to officials—again, not as conclusive proof of a single unified cartel, but as evidence consistent with a state-embedded protection marketplace. The Guardian+1
5) Where is the cocaine sourced—and why Venezuela is discussed as a transit platform
To answer “where are the drugs sourced,” you don’t start in Venezuela. Cocaine supply begins in coca cultivation and processing, overwhelmingly concentrated in the Andean region.
An EU parliamentary briefing (drawing on UNODC reporting) states that Colombia remains the world’s largest coca cultivator (about 61% share of global production), followed by Peru (26%) and Bolivia (13%). Europäisches Parlament
So the Venezuela-relevant question is less “where is cocaine produced?” and more:
- Why route through Venezuela at all?
- Which chokepoints make Venezuela valuable as a corridor?
Here, the public U.S. narrative emphasizes:
- western border adjacency to Colombia,
- Caribbean coastline access,
- state control over ports, airspace, and enforcement discretion.
The 2020 DOJ release describes trafficking from Venezuela via Caribbean/Central America transshipment points, with maritime movement via go-fast vessels, fishing boats, and container ships, and an “air bridge” narrative toward Honduras through unauthorized flights. Justizministerium
Even critics who dispute the scale often concede the basic logic: Venezuela’s geography makes it a plausible corridor for shipments moving north and east.
6) Where does it get sold? The U.S. and Europe as endpoints
Two market realities can coexist:
A. The U.S. as the classic endpoint in U.S. legal narratives
U.S. indictments and press statements naturally center the U.S. consumer market and U.S. jurisdiction. The DOJ’s 2020 framing is explicitly U.S.-focused: cocaine imported into the United States. Justizministerium
B. Europe’s booming demand and port vulnerability
The EU briefing notes record cocaine seizures and describes Europe as a major market, with massive seizures in ports like Antwerp and Rotterdam and strong evidence that European demand has surged over the last decade. Europäisches Parlament
So if you’re mapping “ultimate markets,” the clean answer is:
- North America (especially the U.S.) remains a prime endpoint in U.S. enforcement narratives.
- Europe is also a major endpoint, reflected in seizures and strategic EU concern.
That doesn’t require Venezuela to be the dominant corridor to Europe—only that some flows plausibly connect.
7) Does this alleged business “fund terrorism”? What can be said without guessing
I can’t responsibly “guess” in the sense of inventing linkages beyond evidence. What I can do is evaluate the strongest public signals and how they map onto the terrorism-finance concept.
Step 1: Define what “funding terrorism” could mean here
It can mean at least four different things:
- Direct financing: drug proceeds transferred to a designated terrorist group for attacks/operations.
- Material support: weapons, training, safe haven, logistics, documents, laundering.
- Shared enterprise: a terrorist group itself participates in the drug trade.
- Legal relabeling: governments apply terrorism designations to criminal groups, changing the legal category without proving ideological motivation.
The controversy in this area is often that observers slide between #1 and #4.
Step 2: What’s actually alleged in major U.S. actions?
- DOJ (2020) alleged partnership with the FARC and used “narco-terrorism” framing. Justizministerium
- DOJ (2025) announced Carvajal’s guilty plea including narco-terrorism “for the benefit of the FARC.” Justizministerium
- Treasury (2025) claimed Cartel de los Soles provided material support to groups the U.S. designated as FTOs (Tren de Aragua and Sinaloa Cartel), and designated Cartel de los Soles as SDGT. U.S. Department of the Treasury+1
- State (via Federal Register notice, 2025) designated Cartel de los Soles as an FTO. Federal Register
These are strong allegations and legal positions by the U.S. government. They imply, at minimum, that U.S. agencies believe they can support a “material support” narrative in their records.
Step 3: What about Hezbollah / ideologically driven terrorism?
A CRS overview notes that in 2008 Treasury sanctioned certain Venezuela-based individuals/entities for providing financial support to Hezbollah (a classic terrorism-finance case), separate from the narcotics designations. Congress.gov
That CRS fact does not prove drug proceeds funded Hezbollah. It supports a narrower point: U.S. policy circles have long worried about Venezuela-related permissive environments for illicit finance that could touch terrorist groups.
Step 4: The most defensible assessment
Based on publicly documented actions:
- There is credible public evidence that drug trafficking and armed groups intersect (especially through allegations and at least one guilty plea involving the FARC). Justizministerium+1
- There is public documentation that the U.S. government now treats certain criminal organizations as “terrorist” for legal purposes, which expands the terrorism-finance frame (whether or not the groups are ideologically motivated in the classic sense). Federal Register+2AP News+2
- There is not (in the sources above) a clean, publicly demonstrated money trail that lets an outside analyst confidently say: “drug profits from Venezuela-funded terrorist attacks X, Y, Z.” Anything that specific would be speculative unless you have access to sealed case evidence or financial intelligence.
So the cautious conclusion is:
It is plausible—indeed alleged in major U.S. proceedings—that trafficking profits and state protection have supported or benefited armed groups (and that some relationships meet U.S. “material support” or “narco-terrorism” theories). But moving from that to a confident claim of “funding terrorism” in the direct operational sense requires evidence that is not publicly established in a way an external analyst can verify.
8) A political-science model: “hybrid state” incentives and why drugs matter
The most interesting analytical move is not to argue whether there is a single cartel meeting minutes every Tuesday. It is to ask:
What incentives would cause factions of a state to tolerate or monetize trafficking?
InSight Crime’s “hybrid state” model is useful here: when regimes face economic collapse, sanctions pressure, internal factionalism, and loyalty problems, illicit economies can become political glue—a revenue stream that pays loyalists, keeps security organs invested, and binds elites through shared risk. fln.dk
In that model, “bad apples” aren’t the exception; they’re the system’s informal payroll.
This also helps explain your plausible deniability intuition:
- A hybrid state benefits from selective visibility: enough enforcement to claim legitimacy, enough impunity to keep rents flowing.
- When a node is exposed, the system sacrifices it (the “bad apple”) to preserve the broader bargain.
9) What remains uncertain, contested, or structurally hard to prove
Even with indictments, sanctions, and pleas, three uncertainties remain:
- Scale: How much volume truly transits Venezuela relative to other corridors? Some reporting suggests experts dispute U.S. claims about the Caribbean route’s current share, implying political inflation is possible. The Guardian
- Command and control: Is there centralized direction, or a marketplace of protection? Many accounts lean toward the latter. fln.dk+1
- Attribution: In state-embedded systems, it’s hard to separate “policy” from “corruption” because enforcement discretion itself is the commodity.
These uncertainties don’t make the allegations “fake.” They mean the correct mental model is probabilistic and network-based, not cinematic.
Closing synthesis
If you compress the best-supported picture into one sentence:
“Cartel de los Soles” is best treated as a label for alleged state-embedded trafficking facilitation—overlapping protection networks within Venezuelan institutions—rather than a traditional cartel brand; the U.S. has backed this narrative with indictments, sanctions, an FTO designation notice, and at least one major guilty plea, while Venezuela and some observers dispute the scale and coherence of the alleged organization. The Guardian+4Justizministerium+4Justizministerium+4
